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A	missed	opportunity?	Revisiting	the	euro
referendum	that	never	was	from	a	historical
perspective
In	1997	all	the	main	parties	promised	a	referendum	on	whether	Britain	should	join	the	euro,	but	eventually	Labour
ruled	out	membership.	Anti-euro	campaigners	went	on	to	hone	their	arguments	in	the	2016	referendum.	Stuart
Smedley	(King’s	College	London)	suggests	that	this	may	have	been	a	missed	opportunity	for	the	government	to
tackle	Eurosceptic	narratives.
Early	historical	accounts	of	the	United	Kingdom’s	engagement	with	the	process	of	European	integration	categorised
the	failure	to	join	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	and	European	Economic	Community	at	their	launch	as
representing	‘missed	opportunities’.	These	decisions,	it	was	argued,	denied	Britain	a	leadership	role	in	Europe,
which	accession	to	the	EEC	in	1973	only	partially	rectified.	With	time,	however,	this	historical	interpretation	came	to
be	challenged	as	more	measured	assessments	of	these	decisions	emerged.
Yet	in	light	of	the	outcome	of	the	2016	referendum,	it	is	worthwhile	revisiting	the	‘missed	opportunities’	thesis	and
using	it	as	a	frame	through	which	to	analyse	domestic	aspects	of	Britain’s	European	integration	policy.	One
decision	in	particular	stands	out	as	being	worthy	of	such	treatment:	the	failure	of	Tony	Blair’s	Labour	government	to
hold	a	referendum	on	joining	the	single	European	currency.
On	the	face	of	it,	this	may	seem	like	a	sensible	policy	choice.	It	appeared	highly	likely	that	a	referendum	would	have
led	to	the	British	public	rejecting	the	euro.	Indeed,	referendum	voting	intention	polling	on	the	subject	showed	a
consistently	strong	lead	for	those	who	would	vote	‘No’	–	even	when	the	public	were	presented	with	a	hypothetical
scenario	in	which	the	government	recommended	a	vote	in	favour.
However,	through	an	analysis	of	the	Blair	government’s	policy	towards	the	euro,	campaign	material	produced	by
anti-euro	campaign	groups,	as	well	as	historical	opinion	poll	data,	it	becomes	apparent	this	was	arguably	a	‘missed
opportunity’	–	and	that	Labour	perhaps	should	have	held	a	referendum	on	the	principle	of	British	membership	of	the
single	currency.
Alongside	the	Conservatives	and	Liberal	Democrats,	ahead	of	the	1997	general	election	Labour	promised	that	any
decision	to	join	the	planned	single	currency	would	require	the	consent	of	the	British	public.	For	Labour,	a
referendum	would	be	the	final	stage	of	the	path	towards	adopting	the	euro,	but	it	would	only	have	been	held	if
Cabinet	and	Parliament	had	provided	their	approval.	Labour	also	insisted	that	any	decision	to	join	would	have	to	be
‘determined	by	a	hard-headed	assessment	of	Britain’s	economic	interests’.	As	a	result,	in	October	1997	Chancellor
Gordon	Brown	set	out	the	five	economic	tests	that	would	have	to	be	satisfied.
Yet	the	five	tests,	along	with	the	National	Changeover	Plan	announced	in	1999,	seemed	to	signal	that	the
government	was	making	preparations	to	adopt	the	single	currency	–	and	thus	to	hold	a	referendum.	This
speculation	was	fuelled	further	by	the	Eurosceptic	press.	But	Labour	did	not	help	themselves.	Indeed,	it	was	not
until	June	2003	–	five	and	a	half	years	after	they	were	initially	announced	–	that	the	five	tests	were	reassessed.
During	that	time,	Europe	sustained	a	high	level	of	public	salience.	According	to	Ipsos	MORI’s	Issues	Index,	prior	to
the	1997	general	election	a	record	43%	of	British	adults	mentioned	Europe	as	an	important	issue	facing	Britain	(this
was	the	highest	level	of	importance	it	would	achieve	until	February	2017).	While	concern	declined	after	Labour
entered	office,	between	1998	and	2000	Europe’s	average	monthly	importance	matched	that	for	unemployment	–
the	dominant	issue	of	the	early	1990s	–	and	was	only	bettered	by	health	and	education.	Furthermore,	Europe’s
salience	only	receded	after	the	2003	assessment	of	the	five	tests,	an	event	which	made	it	clear	that	Britain	would
not	be	joining	the	euro.
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Anti-euro	campaign	groups	subsequently	took	advantage	of	this	situation,	launching	a	form	of	proxy	campaign	in
which	their	views	went	largely	unchallenged.	The	most	prominent	organisations	established	were	Business	for
Sterling	(whose	early	Head	of	Research	was	a	certain	Dominic	Cummings)	and	New	Europe.	These	groups	would
then	merge	to	form	the	‘No’	campaign	in	2000.	With	the	support	of	prominent	business	organisations,	including	the
Institute	of	Directors	(IoD),	these	groups	expressed	doubts	about	the	economic	case	for	adopting	the	single
currency.	Intriguingly	though,	they	did	not	outright	reject	the	euro’s	purported	economic	benefits.	Instead	they
merely	argued	against	adoption	‘for	the	foreseeable	future’	on	economic	grounds.
But	the	questioning	of	the	economic	case	appeared	to	be	a	means	to	lend	greater	credibility	to	the	far	more	emotive
reasons	they	gave	for	rejecting	the	single	currency.	The	crux	of	their	arguments	against	the	euro	related	to	control
and	identity	–	two	themes	that	not	only	resonated	with	the	public,	but	further	embedded	themselves	in	popular
discourse	about	the	EU	and	variations	of	which	were	returned	to	with	great	effect	in	the	2016	referendum.
The	idea	that	adopting	the	euro	would	see	Britain	lose	control	over	key	aspects	of	economic	policy	was	one	that
featured	heavily	in	the	campaign	groups’	literature,	examples	of	which	can	be	found	in	the	LSE	Archive’s
‘Eurosceptic’	collection.	The	‘No’	campaign	even	produced	a	leaflet	that	used	a	pair	of	handcuffs	to	depict	the
effects	of	the	currency,	which	they	claimed	would	‘lock’	Britain	into	economic	policies	that	would	be	heavily	to	its
disadvantage.
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‘No’	campaign	leaflet,	undated	but	probably	2000	or	2001	(LSE/EUROSCEPTIC/11/3)
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Arguments	about	control	tapped	into	a	belief	strongly	evident	among	the	British	public.	Eurobarometer	surveys
conducted	in	1995,	1996,	1998	and	2001	found	that	between	six	in	ten	and	two-thirds	of	British	adults	felt	that
joining	the	single	currency	would	‘imply	that	Britain	will	lose	control	over	its	economy	policy’.	Unsurprisingly,	this
view	was	held	by	an	overwhelming	majority	with	a	negative	view	of	the	EU.	But	even	those	who	considered	Britain’s
EU	membership	to	be	a	good	thing	were	more	likely	to	accept	this	argument,	with	around	half	doing	so	in	1995	and
1996.
Public	opinion	in	Britain	on	whether	the	euro	will	or	will	not…	(Source:	Eurobarometer)
	 1995 1996 1998 2001
Imply	that	Britain	will	lose	control	over	its	economic	policy
Will	% 66 64 62 59
Will	not	% 21 22 20 17
Don't	know	% 13 14 18 24
Imply	that	Britain	will	lose	too	much	of	its	national	identity
Will	% 66 63 62
Will	not	% 26 28 22
Don't	know	% 9 10 13
Note:	Data	are	based	on	the	author’s	own	calculations	and	have	been	taken	from	the	following	Eurobarometer	files	in	each	year:
EB44	and	EB44.1	(1995),	EB45.1,	EB46	and	EB46.1	(1996),	EB50	(1998)	and	EB55	(2001).	Data	have	been	filtered	to	adults	aged	18
and	over	in	Great	Britain	in	order	to	reflect	those	of	voting	age.	Percentages	may	not	total	100	due	to	rounding.
In	2001,	the	question	used	was	altered	to	ask	the	extent	to	which	respondents	agreed	or	disagreed	that	the	euro	will	lead	to	various
outcomes.	For	the	purpose	of	this	post,	in	the	table	above	those	answering	‘Totally	agree’	and	‘Somewhat	agree’	have	been
combined	as	have	those	answering	‘Totally	disagree’	and	‘Somewhat	disagree’.	Strictly	speaking	though,	2001	data	is	not	directly
comparable	to	that	shown	for	previous	years.
Anti-euro	groups	also	sought	to	portray	the	euro	as	another	step	towards	undermining	the	sovereignty	and	identity
of	nation	states.	In	a	1998	booklet,	Business	for	Sterling	labelled	the	currency	as	‘a	political	project	[that]	flows	from
an	ambition	to	create	a	single	political	and	economic	entity	in	Europe’.	Meanwhile,	in	a	pamphlet	authored	by	the
economist	Sir	James	Ball,	New	Europe	described	the	euro	as	‘a	key	element	in	the	march	towards	some	form	of
European	Federal	State’	and	that	it	was	‘a	gross	deception	for	the	British	government	to	pretend	otherwise’.
The	most	similar	notion	tested	on	Eurobarometer	related	to	the	idea	that	adopting	the	euro	would	‘imply	that	Britain
will	lose	too	much	of	its	identity’.	A	clear	majority	felt	this	would	occur,	with	around	two-thirds	doing	so.	Among
those	with	negative	opinions	of	Britain’s	EU	membership,	the	size	of	the	majority	agreeing	with	this	statement	was
again	substantial.	In	contrast,	although	around	half	who	believed	EU	membership	to	be	a	good	thing	disputed	the
idea	in	1996	and	1998,	comfortably	more	than	a	third	accepted	this	argument	regarding	the	euro	and	national
identity.
It	is	therefore	clear	that	anti-euro	groups	grasped	the	mood	of	public	opinion	in	Britain	regarding	the	single
currency.	Yet	with	no	referendum	called,	their	arguments	went	largely	unchallenged.	To	confound	matters,	Labour’s
prevarication	over	holding	a	vote	and	the	policy	measures	taken	regarding	the	single	currency	fuelled	speculation
and	uncertainty,	which	these	campaign	groups	made	the	most	of.
Having	developed	arguments	that	struck	an	obvious	chord	–	and	with	veterans	of	the	anti-euro	campaign	engaged
in	the	Leave	campaign	–	the	anti-euro	groups’	narratives	would	be	reimagined	to	great	effect	in	the	2016	vote	on
Britain’s	EU	membership.	And	for	this	reason,	Labour’s	decision	not	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	single	currency
can	even	be	seen	as	a	missed	opportunity	with	significant	long-term	consequences.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.
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